Clapham Juction rail crash

[Nortube]

12 December is the 25th anniversary of the Clapham Junction rail crash - a three train crash in which 35 people died and around 500 were injured on 12 December 1988:
[ Click here ]  [ Click here ]

The Hidden report into the accident is here:
[ Click here ]


Two major incidents on the railways within just over a year of each other, the other being the Kings Cross fire on the Underground in which 31 people died on 18 November 1887.

The Fennel report into the fire is here:
[ Click here ]

[mrhappy]

I had just driven a Hammersmith train through there when it all kicked off. Remember it well.

[Nortube]

I was diverted down the SB CX branch for my last trip due to "Smouldering at KX"

[mrhappy]

I liked the way they first said it was a match, then said it was a cigarette butt. Yet these had not burnt, nor had the grease around them?

[railtechnician]

Dec 1, 2013 19:06:25 GMT mrhappy said:

I had just driven a Hammersmith train through there when it all kicked off. Remember it well.

I was working late at Farringdon installing new telephone equipment in the signal cabin relay room as part of the Aldgate area resignalling. I passed though the Kings Cross ticket hall just after 1920 on my way to Seven Sisters where I used to park my car on day shifts. I wasn't going directly home but driving to Holloway to visit a fellow chargehand socially as arranged earlier in the day. I got to his maisonette at about 2000 just as the disaster began to unfold on the TV news channels. I was absolutely gobsmacked at what was unfolding especially as I knew the site very well and had done various works there in the recent past. A colleague was involved in the ongoing works associated with the temporary operations room and I was of course aware of such works in progress on day shift although I knew none of my colleagues would've been on site as they finished no later than 1600. However, my supervisor's line manager was the first comms representative on site, having also seen what was unfolding on the TV and deciding to go to the scene. If memory serves it was a Thursday evening and I had plans for the weekend but when I made my way in to work next morning I was told to make preparation for emergency work over the weekend at Kings Cross. 
On Saturday morning we (Comms installation) booked on at 0800 and travelled by van to Kings Cross, the van laden with everything we thought useful as we weren't sure what was required although we knew that we had to run in emergency tie cables between the various Comms equipment rooms and temporary telephone lines wherever required. Comms maintenance had been on site as soon as they were allowed on Friday and had provided some emergency facilities in the Victoria line station supervisor office and Electrical Installation were also on site putting in temporary emergency electrical facilities as required.
Booking on at Kings Cross was done in the Met line station supervisors office and controlled by a Signal Manager, our site pass being 'Paddington Bear' luggage 'D' labels as that was all that was available at the time (I may still have mine to this day somewhere!). The Picc side of the ticket hall was a total no-go area and separated from the Vic side by a hoarding, the whole area being sealed up tight due to asbestos contamination which had been released as a result of the fire, a cleanup team having been the first engineering crew on site to make the area safe. At the time we were told that the plan was to have the station open again on Monday (of course that never happened, ISTR it was at least a fortnight or more later) to serve Victoria and Northern lines and so our efforts were directed to running temporary cables from the Piccadilly line platform inverts to the Northern line Comms Equipment Room in the Northern line escalator concourse. We worked until 0000 booking off at site and doubling back directly to site at 0800 Sunday working until 2200 as we had to double back again for normal day shift at South Kensington depot at 0700 Monday.
The taxi rank became a stores area and staff car park and we also were allowed free parking immediately adjacent to the site. LT catering turned up on the pavement at the top of the stairs to the 'Kyber Pass' to feed us with hot food several times a day. By the end of the Sunday shift we had installed temporary direct line and auto phones where required including one in the Midland subway and I had redesigned the available PA facility to make it usable again. At the time the Picc line platform inverts were partially flooded and the mosquitoes were biting. I will never forget the smell of smoke which permeated my clothes to such an extent that weekend that I had to throw them away, that smell lingered in the station for weeks afterward as I remained on site for several weeks working hand in hand with electrical installation and external contractors while I installed and commissioned the comms facilities in the new ops room at the top of the escalators on 0700-1900 day shifts.
Subsequently like several others I was interviewed as to my knowledge of previous and ongoing works at the site by the engineer who was compiling evidence of certain events for presentation to the Fennell enquiry.
The Kings Cross fire was a tragedy but it was probably an accident waiting to happen, at the time I had been with LT/LU for more than 10 years and had seen how quickly fires spread in tunnels (burning under the dust) and how overheating machinery caught light on several occasions. Having come from the Post Office I was well aware that LU H&S was at a much lower standard than I had been trained to and yet I never felt unduly concerned or in danger. I guess spending lots of time on nights in tunnels conditioned me somewhat.
However, I would contend that the Kings Cross fire also kept many engineering staff in employment for at least 10 years longer than might otherwise have been the case although eventually the amount of work created as a direct result was simply beyond the available engineering resources and staff and led to the great outsourcing of engineering work to external contractors to install fire detection and suppression systems and new whole station integrated (section 12) PA systems along with associated equipment i.e. additional CCTV facilities and systems, additional station radio facilities etc. This in turn identified a need for better electrical facilities and the need for proper identification of comms, signals and other cables on all lines (the records had never been properly updated and thus were only a rough guide!).
On a personal note I was promoted directly as a result of work that I did at Kings Cross following the fire.