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Post by dave1 on May 17, 2013 8:26:19 GMT
I understand that this is open (Palestra) does that mean that all those that were planned to move have done and if there was a reason to evacuate the building where do they all go to back to their previous locations or somewhere else.
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Post by GentlemanJim on May 17, 2013 8:57:13 GMT
I understand that this is open (Palestra) does that mean that all those that were planned to move have done and if there was a reason to evacuate the building where do they all go to back to their previous locations or somewhere else. I assume you're talking about NOC (No One Cares)? If, like the Line control rooms there is no real effective backup then LU will again be flying by the seat of it's pants should a major problem occur. I can't say for certain as I don't know but I'd assume some kind of provision has been made elsewhere but knowing the shortsightedness of LU I wouldn't put money on it. This was discussed in another thread regarding the lack of a fully equipped backup control room on the Central Line and in all probability all the other lines. |
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Post by Nortube on May 17, 2013 10:40:38 GMT
I thought that in the evacuation of anywhere, staff went to the staff assembly point - the nearest pub  |
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Post by GentlemanJim on May 17, 2013 14:08:24 GMT
I thought that in the evacuation of anywhere, staff went to the staff assembly point - the nearest pub Only Line Controllers, they work exceptionally hard keeping everyone else in line! |
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Post by 21146 on May 23, 2013 16:37:13 GMT
Yes the previous locations are being maintained as fall-back facilities.
Incidentally staff are not supposed to tell outsiders where they work or what they do which begs the question: if the building is considered such a potential terrorist target then why concentrate so many of TFL's core functions in one place; indeed at a location that was not purpose-built with security in mind?
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Post by cstock on May 23, 2013 22:55:23 GMT
They're not doing a very good job of keeping it secret, I am aware of where this building is simply because I've read an online article and have seen public refferences to it. The article in question, involved a query with a certain incumbent about its cost, which *call me cynical* is why I think LU is moving in to justify that.
Having said that, give it 50 years, the current building will probably be costing more to maintain and the GLA will probably rollick TfL into running it all from a portakabin next to a drive thru McDonalds in Bracknall or something.
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Post by railtechnician on May 24, 2013 11:48:38 GMT
Yes the previous locations are being maintained as fall-back facilities. Incidentally staff are not supposed to tell outsiders where they work or what they do which begs the question: if the building is considered such a potential terrorist target then why concentrate so many of TFL's core functions in one place; indeed at a location that was not purpose-built with security in mind? Just what planet does LUL think it's on, it is a public transportation system, not an intelligence agency. If it wants to separate staff and public areas such that the public have no idea what goes on behind closed doors and where those closed doors are located then it really ought to consider some very basic security. Simple things like not advertising anything that is not strictly necessary for the benefit of the passengers, not plastering LU nameplates at office entrances, having staff report for work in plain clothes to off premise generic office locations with secret access to the railway appearing on stations to mingle with the public from behind typical 'staff toilet', 'station supervisor' etc doors and disappearing thereto at similar locations elsewhere at the end of a shift such that there is no detectable pattern of booking on and off at any point on the system. Obviously rolling stock depots are impossible to hide and there is no need as the more traditional security measures of fencing, surveillance and security guards already exist but security would be improved by all staff reporting for duty somewhere else and appearing as if by magic to be residents i.e. never seen to do anything but come and go in the cab of a train in uniform.
Next would be to withdraw all personal issue keys from all staff and all those held on stations and elsewhere in insecure locations to be replaced with a single electronic keycard for each and every member of staff and new electronic keycard operated locks on all security critical doors system wide. The keycards to be wiped on a daily basis as staff book off and reprogrammed when booking on at shift start, levels of access per individual to be determined according to rank, remit, status, where status is further determined by licenses held, recorded and verified knowledge, experience and training, PNC check and environment in which entitled to work along with the necessary permissions to enter and work in such locations. Thus ensuring that no 'key' can ever leave the system and that no individual has access to anywhere except where they are allowed and specified to be.
I could go on but you get the idea, any company serious about security and the maintenance of its integrity would be totally rethinking the way that it operates. To be fair when I began my LT career one could wander virtually anywhere on the system without let or hindrance and things have changed considerably since the 1970s, I'm sure they have changed a fair amount since I retired 8 years ago too but there really is much more that might be done! |
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Post by cstock on May 24, 2013 21:48:47 GMT
The content of this thread seems to be eerily timely considering the events of today,
It seems a bit of a no brainer to issue LUL operational staff with security passes, it wouldn't exactly be hard! perhaps even incorporate a security feature in the already existing travel pass that can be hung on a lanyard? Sure something was suggested years ago about this.
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Post by 21146 on May 25, 2013 13:37:47 GMT
Yes the previous locations are being maintained as fall-back facilities. Incidentally staff are not supposed to tell outsiders where they work or what they do which begs the question: if the building is considered such a potential terrorist target then why concentrate so many of TFL's core functions in one place; indeed at a location that was not purpose-built with security in mind? Just what planet does LUL think it's on, it is a public transportation system, not an intelligence agency. If it wants to separate staff and public areas such that the public have no idea what goes on behind closed doors and where those closed doors are located then it really ought to consider some very basic security. Simple things like not advertising anything that is not strictly necessary for the benefit of the passengers, not plastering LU nameplates at office entrances, having staff report for work in plain clothes to off premise generic office locations with secret access to the railway appearing on stations to mingle with the public from behind typical 'staff toilet', 'station supervisor' etc doors and disappearing thereto at similar locations elsewhere at the end of a shift such that there is no detectable pattern of booking on and off at any point on the system. Obviously rolling stock depots are impossible to hide and there is no need as the more traditional security measures of fencing, surveillance and security guards already exist but security would be improved by all staff reporting for duty somewhere else and appearing as if by magic to be residents i.e. never seen to do anything but come and go in the cab of a train in uniform.
Next would be to withdraw all personal issue keys from all staff and all those held on stations and elsewhere in insecure locations to be replaced with a single electronic keycard for each and every member of staff and new electronic keycard operated locks on all security critical doors system wide. The keycards to be wiped on a daily basis as staff book off and reprogrammed when booking on at shift start, levels of access per individual to be determined according to rank, remit, status, where status is further determined by licenses held, recorded and verified knowledge, experience and training, PNC check and environment in which entitled to work along with the necessary permissions to enter and work in such locations. Thus ensuring that no 'key' can ever leave the system and that no individual has access to anywhere except where they are allowed and specified to be.
I could go on but you get the idea, any company serious about security and the maintenance of its integrity would be totally rethinking the way that it operates. To be fair when I began my LT career one could wander virtually anywhere on the system without let or hindrance and things have changed considerably since the 1970s, I'm sure they have changed a fair amount since I retired 8 years ago too but there really is much more that might be done! |
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Post by 21146 on May 25, 2013 13:41:20 GMT
In fact there is no TFL logo of any kind outside this building "somewhere in southern London", merely the street address in non-Johnston font. Even in the foyer there is not one photo or artefact relating to buses or trains, historic or modern, as if TFL is ashamed of its history (and present). An awful clinical characterless place in which to work with no privacy or personal space for staff.
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Post by railtechnician on May 25, 2013 15:37:15 GMT
In fact there is no TFL logo of any kind outside this building "somewhere in southern London", merely the street address in non-Johnston font. Even in the foyer there is not one photo or artifact relating to buses or trains, historic or modern, as if TFL is ashamed of its history (and present). An awful clinical characterless place in which to work with no privacy or personal space for staff. Sounds just as it should be and even better if the surveillance is also invisible, camera housings on the outside walls are dead giveaways and there are usually other clues, for instance fleet vehicles arriving occasionally, visiting staff in uniform and uniformed security guards visible at a reception desk etc. It is the little details that are often forgotten like phone numbers which can be used to locate a general or specific general geographical area. Security relies heavily upon communications and so obfuscation is key to maintaining the integrity of secure facilities. The most secure location I could imagine would be a large room with no windows, no hidden drawers or lockers, fully monitored communications i.e. email, browsing, intranet, live room, recorded audio lines, CCTV, frequency specific (breakage detection), heat and smoke detectors, no accessible power and communications outlets, access/egress blast doors locked at all times and manned by both internal and external security staff at specified allowable access/egress times e.g. on the hour. Staggered staff shifts on the hour every four hours 24/7, staff searched before entering the complex and again when leaving and records compared in real time at every shift change. A complete ban on food and drink, except water, and all personal items, no documents of any kind to be handled by staff entering and leaving the complex i.e. other authorised parties tasked with maintaining document integrity if not possible via intranet. I imagine much of this already exists now but if not you get the picture! |
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Post by Admin on May 29, 2013 8:51:17 GMT
I visited a few months back and the kitchen facilities were wonderful. Really shows a stark contrast between that and the new control room for SSR and the Pic line. There are houses opposite that look directly in which surprised me. Remembering the attack on MI6 by the IRA. But that said there will also Police and EDF workers there so presumably its not just LU who have deemed it safe but the BTP and EDF. Both of which will be used to having to make sure security is up to standard.
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Post by railtechnician on May 29, 2013 16:29:18 GMT
I visited a few months back and the kitchen facilities were wonderful. Really shows a stark contrast between that and the new control room for SSR and the Pic line. There are houses opposite that look directly in which surprised me. Remembering the attack on MI6 by the IRA. But that said there will also Police and EDF workers there so presumably its not just LU who have deemed it safe but the BTP and EDF. Both of which will be used to having to make sure security is up to standard. From the outside there is no way to know what goes on behind all that black glass if the fit out has been done to a particular standard. The only problem with such locations is the artificial environment, artificial daylight and air movement, otherwise I expect it is comfortable in comparison to the vast majority of LU locations. What I fail to comprehend is why TfL were happy to publish the location on its website and why the fit out contractors were allowed to mention it and what they had done to it in general terms on their website. I do wonder what it has cost, in terms of rent, fit out, relocation of staff, installation of specific communications etc and how it is justified in times of austerity (unless it was done without above inflation council tax hikes or government grant). I expect the relocation of the BTP not to be insignificant bearing in mind all the individual and joint facilities available at 55 Broadway requiring to be transferred but expect that is paid predominantly from a specific BTP budget. I'm wondering where EDF fit as I thought it had sold off its interests in LUL Power supply distribution to another company. |
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