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Post by hellocontrol on May 11, 2015 10:49:31 GMT
I see that from the new timetable they are not stabling trains in these sidings due to the condition, I remember in the early 1970s the drivers now days should think themselves lucky.
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Post by railtechnician on May 13, 2015 10:58:25 GMT
I see that from the new timetable they are not stabling trains in these sidings due to the condition, I remember in the early 1970s the drivers now days should think themselves lucky. I wonder what has changed since the late 1980s resignalling when I was working in the sidings night after night wiring and commissioning the SPTs and illuminated Come-to-Telephone signs. It was a sweat box but no more hazardous than similar locations IMO. Mind you it could, like any area of the railway, be a very dangerous place to be especially on day shift! Circa 1980 when the running SM was based in an office on the end of the NB platform I and my gang of installation technicians were asked to run a clock cable from the signal cabin clock equipment to the platform during traffic hours after the morning rush hour to assist the clock section technicians who were installing a new platform clock at the headwall. The cable route was from the signal cabin relay room into the northbound tunnel cable bracket run to the platform headwall, approximately 50 metres all tolled as I recall. I queried my supervisor who was present regarding protection arrangements and took him at his word when he said that the running SM was to place a man at the headwall with a red handlamp to hold any train in the platform for the few minutes my gang was to be in the siding tunnel. I left one man in the cabin relay room to feed the cable out through the duct to the bracket run and the rest of us entered the tunnel. I stood by the duct in the tunnel and fed the cable off to my lead man to pull to the headwall with about 5 metres of slack and then the gang quickly dressed the cable into the run as they exited to the platform. I was last man out and could see a train approaching the platform as I checked the cable was properly dressed in. It was halfway into the platform as I stepped up to the platform at the headwall. The train was empty, didn't stop, and ran straight into the siding to reverse. The man who was supposed to be at the headwall to exhibit a handlamp and speak to the driver was not there, neither was my supervisor who apparently had left the station as soon as we entered the tunnel. I had been with LT just a couple of years at the time but was new to the telephone section and new to day work at tube stations having spent most of my time in the job up to then on night shift with signal New Works. I sent my gang to lunch while I returned to depot and turned the air blue in my supervisors office. That was not the first time that I had, had what would now be called a 'near miss' incident but it was the day that stood me in good stead from an H&S viewpoint for the next 25+ years as it taught me the most valuable lesson of all i.e. trust nothing and no-one but oneself and ensure that everyone in the working party knows exactly what is to be done and how, as well as checking that everyone is fully aware of the protection arrangements. Thereafter I was never afraid to refuse to work on the grounds of H&S and invariably personally took charge of my own protection arrangements especially when working within Possessions.
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Post by hellocontrol on May 16, 2015 5:45:18 GMT
RT that incident you mention was that when there was a signal cabin still in operation? I have seen a few incidents in my days most were never reported as there was no such thing as H&S and even in later days some things were just explained as a glitch.
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Post by railtechnician on May 16, 2015 23:05:23 GMT
RT that incident you mention was that when there was a signal cabin still in operation? I have seen a few incidents in my days most were never reported as there was no such thing as H&S and even in later days some things were just explained as a glitch. Yes of course, the cabin didn't go until the late 1980s resignalling. ISTR that all the extant Bakerloo cabins went over two changeover shifts. Elephant & Castle and Lambeth North went together IIRC, I was on that changeover working at Elephant & Castle cabin and in the tunnels including the road to London Road depot but not Lambeth North cabin. That changeover was Elephant & castle to Embankment and London Road depot. However, the cabin became an IMR before the new control room opened as did Lambeth North, we installed interim telephone at signals answering panels at the stations when the cabins were converted and then centralised all telephones at signals to Baker Street new control room on the night it opened. Queens Park and Paddington went over on the same shift that the control room opened, I worked at all three sites, QPK then PAD then the control room, recommissioning all the telephones at signals, in that order from 2300 to sometime after the start of traffic when attempts to sort the PA & CCTV equipment were officially abandoned to following day shifts. I had a large direct involvement in updating all the line comms in the 1980s including the tunnel telephones, the train radio, the traction earth detection, the telephones at signals, the new control room comms commissioning etc. but control room autos and direct lines were upgraded by British Telecom (the control room screen touch panels being a BT system) and LT comms colleagues were responsible for the somewhat disastrous transfer of the PA & CCTV to the new desks which AFAIR was not working fully for several shifts after the new control room was in service. I spent many shifts leading up to the changeovers walking all the tunnels wiring up the stick telephones etc, running the new train radio cables off trains from Embankment to Elephant, subsequently making more than 150 joints in those cables in two installation stages. I installed new tunnel telephones at all sites after, AFAIR, the new control room opened as a follow up T/T upgrade project. It is all beginning to seem to be ancient history now, of course it is as was a little over 25 years ago and the memories are fading faster than ever as my little grey cells seem to be aging more rapidly every month!
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Post by hellocontrol on May 17, 2015 12:34:34 GMT
I am surprised at that happening as the relay room was next door to the cabin so why the signalman cleared BS5H into the siding and knowing the SMs at the time were normally of the good ones around. Nowdays there is the key protection switch that would keep the home signal BS21 route 2 for the SB platform and BS22 shunt to siding at danger, there are a few more signals like the siding exit and the main line shunt north of the station and the shunt from the other platform to that siding.
Now having said that I know local arrangements took place at some locations but in this case there was a complete breakdown. Many years ago we used to stable 5 trains at the Elephant both platforms and sidings then a train would be put between the SB platform and siding train tight to say the least, another local arrangement that was never published.
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Post by railtechnician on May 17, 2015 13:56:15 GMT
I am surprised at that happening as the relay room was next door to the cabin so why the signalman cleared BS5H into the siding and knowing the SMs at the time were normally of the good ones around. Nowdays there is the key protection switch that would keep the home signal BS21 route 2 for the SB platform and BS22 shunt to siding at danger, there are a few more signals like the siding exit and the main line shunt north of the station and the shunt from the other platform to that siding. Now having said that I know local arrangements took place at some locations but in this case there was a complete breakdown. Many years ago we used to stable 5 trains at the Elephant both platforms and sidings then a train would be put between the SB platform and siding train tight to say the least, another local arrangement that was never published. I recall asking for the lever(s) to be collared to prevent trains entering the S/B siding tunnel for the few minutes that I expected to be in the tunnel but that request was refused by the running SM in favour of placing a railman at the headwall. As my supervisor was present at the time I accepted his word that it was a satisfactory arrangement under the old 'all parties must come to a complete agreement' procedure as used to be written in the 1974 rule book. The running SM called the shots, not the signalman ! As I say I learnt a valuable lesson that day which stood me in good stead for the rest of my career, it was not the first time that I had, had such a near miss, nor was it the last but it was the only time that such an arrangement resulted in a near miss. I used the same principle many times in later years on my own behalf and when working for others but always double checked that the arrangements were fully understood and properly implemented by all before proceeding to do work. The working manual of course had the same 'ad hoc' arrangement written into it but many would shy away from the apparent complications and complexity because of the way that every role appeared to be expressed in a 'cast in stone' manner. A good example was rebuilding the point chairlock units at the east end of the westbound tunnel at Heathrow T123 during morning traffic hours before the peak with the current remaining ON and terminating trains running only into the eastbound platform over the scissors. Not for the inexperienced or faint of heart but with full trust in the line controller informing drivers, the signalling which we forced to maintain the appropriate routes at danger, the station supervisor and of course ourselves!
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Post by hellocontrol on May 19, 2015 8:06:59 GMT
I know that the SMs at the Elephant had a good working relationship with the signalmen they were in my day qualified for the cabin but I still can't understand not putting a collar on BS5H lever although that would not have stopped a driver from spadding the signal but the addition of a handsignalman well what more can be said.
I have bent the rules quite a few times over the years but always thought of the consequences if something went wrong and there was never anyone put in a position of danger.
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Post by Vernon on Jun 2, 2015 6:42:15 GMT
I am surprised at that happening as the relay room was next door to the cabin so why the signalman cleared BS5H into the siding and knowing the SMs at the time were normally of the good ones around. Nowdays there is the key protection switch that would keep the home signal BS21 route 2 for the SB platform and BS22 shunt to siding at danger, there are a few more signals like the siding exit and the main line shunt north of the station and the shunt from the other platform to that siding. Now having said that I know local arrangements took place at some locations but in this case there was a complete breakdown. Many years ago we used to stable 5 trains at the Elephant both platforms and sidings then a train would be put between the SB platform and siding train tight to say the least, another local arrangement that was never published. Hi hellocontrol, could you tell me the procedure used on the E&C lever frame to put a 5th train between the SB platform and siding train. Thanks in advance, Vernon.
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Post by hellocontrol on Jun 2, 2015 12:02:01 GMT
I am surprised at that happening as the relay room was next door to the cabin so why the signalman cleared BS5H into the siding and knowing the SMs at the time were normally of the good ones around. Nowdays there is the key protection switch that would keep the home signal BS21 route 2 for the SB platform and BS22 shunt to siding at danger, there are a few more signals like the siding exit and the main line shunt north of the station and the shunt from the other platform to that siding. Now having said that I know local arrangements took place at some locations but in this case there was a complete breakdown. Many years ago we used to stable 5 trains at the Elephant both platforms and sidings then a train would be put between the SB platform and siding train tight to say the least, another local arrangement that was never published. Hi hellocontrol, could you tell me the procedure used on the E&C lever frame to put a 5th train between the SB platform and siding train. Thanks in advance, Vernon. Vernon, Before I answer what is your knowledge of railway working? Do you work for the railway or have an understanding?
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Post by Vernon on Jun 2, 2015 12:12:35 GMT
Hi hellocontrol, could you tell me the procedure used on the E&C lever frame to put a 5th train between the SB platform and siding train. Thanks in advance, Vernon. Vernon, Before I answer what is your knowledge of railway working? Do you work for the railway or have an understanding? HI, thanks for your reply, I feel it may be wise to send you a private message and go from there.
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Post by hellocontrol on Jun 2, 2015 12:29:46 GMT
Vernon,
Okay will wait to hear from you.
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Post by railtechnician on Jun 2, 2015 13:54:00 GMT
Vernon, Okay will wait to hear from you. Haha! Spoilsport! At this point it is perhaps best to state for all those without railway experience or knowledge that absolutely nothing is impossible. There was much that went on back in the day that never 'officially occurred' but such practices which blatantly flouted what was written in black and white cannot be denied. It was not just the operating department, every department knew how to cut corners and bend or break rules to a greater or lesser degree in order to achieve an end. Management turned a blind eye because oiling the wheels so to speak kept trains running and maintained good staff morale. The reasons why such things were done are many and varied but enough said on that score. Of course in the event of a reportable incident occurring as a result of such action invariably a head would roll following an official inquiry. In today's H&S conscious world one would believe/hope that all rules, regulations, practices and procedures are fully complied with, in all honesty only a fool would think it. The railway simply cannot run efficiently without a little 'oil' somewhere and it is only senior management that do not 'know' it. So much that was accepted practice 40 years ago and assumed to be safe has been outlawed in the intervening decades.
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Post by hellocontrol on Jun 2, 2015 18:25:24 GMT
Vernon, Okay will wait to hear from you. Haha! Spoilsport! At this point it is perhaps best to state for all those without railway experience or knowledge that absolutely nothing is impossible. There was much that went on back in the day that never 'officially occurred' but such practices which blatantly flouted what was written in black and white cannot be denied. It was not just the operating department, every department knew how to cut corners and bend or break rules to a greater or lesser degree in order to achieve an end. Management turned a blind eye because oiling the wheels so to speak kept trains running and maintained good staff morale. The reasons why such things were done are many and varied but enough said on that score. Of course in the event of a reportable incident occurring as a result of such action invariably a head would roll following an official inquiry. In today's H&S conscious world one would believe/hope that all rules, regulations, practices and procedures are fully complied with, in all honesty only a fool would think it. The railway simply cannot run efficiently without a little 'oil' somewhere and it is only senior management that do not 'know' it. So much that was accepted practice 40 years ago and assumed to be safe has been outlawed in the intervening decades. RT what are you saying I won't be a spoilsport and will answer Vernon's question although you have mentioned already about things that never officially happened.
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Post by hellocontrol on Jun 2, 2015 18:34:37 GMT
I am surprised at that happening as the relay room was next door to the cabin so why the signalman cleared BS5H into the siding and knowing the SMs at the time were normally of the good ones around. Nowdays there is the key protection switch that would keep the home signal BS21 route 2 for the SB platform and BS22 shunt to siding at danger, there are a few more signals like the siding exit and the main line shunt north of the station and the shunt from the other platform to that siding. Now having said that I know local arrangements took place at some locations but in this case there was a complete breakdown. Many years ago we used to stable 5 trains at the Elephant both platforms and sidings then a train would be put between the SB platform and siding train tight to say the least, another local arrangement that was never published. Hi hellocontrol, could you tell me the procedure used on the E&C lever frame to put a 5th train between the SB platform and siding train. Thanks in advance, Vernon. Vernon, There was no official way to do the moves required and that is why the moves did not occur on a regular basis, only being done when really needed. 1. The first move of getting a train from the SB platform to the south siding train was quite easy the driver would apply the rule at signal BS5H (shunt to SB siding) as it was not possible to clear with the siding being occupied. 2. Second move of train from home signal BS10H/L to SB platform, more or less just like the previous as again it was not possible to clear the signals. If you had to say what procedure was used then you would have to say when signals are failing to clear but you have seen what RT has said and before H&S there were plenty of things going on. I remember at one location where the wrong signal was cleared and there was no release facilities and it was a questions of putting a key down to put the signal back to danger but that is another story.
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Post by railtechnician on Jun 2, 2015 18:54:20 GMT
Haha! Spoilsport! At this point it is perhaps best to state for all those without railway experience or knowledge that absolutely nothing is impossible. There was much that went on back in the day that never 'officially occurred' but such practices which blatantly flouted what was written in black and white cannot be denied. It was not just the operating department, every department knew how to cut corners and bend or break rules to a greater or lesser degree in order to achieve an end. Management turned a blind eye because oiling the wheels so to speak kept trains running and maintained good staff morale. The reasons why such things were done are many and varied but enough said on that score. Of course in the event of a reportable incident occurring as a result of such action invariably a head would roll following an official inquiry. In today's H&S conscious world one would believe/hope that all rules, regulations, practices and procedures are fully complied with, in all honesty only a fool would think it. The railway simply cannot run efficiently without a little 'oil' somewhere and it is only senior management that do not 'know' it. So much that was accepted practice 40 years ago and assumed to be safe has been outlawed in the intervening decades. RT what are you saying I won't be a spoilsport and will answer Vernon's question although you have mentioned already about things that never officially happened. Just a tongue in cheek comment in reference to awaiting a PM !
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